Although this thesis has received an excellent grade, some errors have been pointed out:
- Section 2.2, while formally correct, under closer inspection does not contribute to the argument of the thesis: The argument against neutrality can also be constructed using the difference principle rather than the principle of fair aggregation.
- Section 2.3 contains some errors regarding the status of metaethical relativism and of contractarianism.
- The intuition of neutrality may not be as relevant for climate policy as it is assumed in the thesis. Many thanks to Jacob Rosenthal for insisting on this issue. If you research this topic, make sure you understand its applicability first.
@thesis{pomerenke_argument_2019,
type = {Bachelor's thesis},
author = {Pomerenke, David},
title = {The argument against neutrality about the size of population},
institution = {University of Konstanz},
month = dec,
year = {2019},
language = {en},
url = {https://github.com/davidpomerenke/ba}
}Deutsch — English — Français — Latina
Wie sollen wir als Gesellschaft Veränderungen in der Bevölkerungsgröße bewerten? Ich verteidige die Neutralitäts-Intuition, die einen Teil der Frage beantwortet. Sie besagt, dass es – unter den gleichen Rahmenbedingungen – ethisch irrelevant ist, ob zusätzliche Menschen zu einer Bevölkerung hinzukommen. Das Anti-Neutralitäts-Argument kritisiert die Neutralitäts-Intuition als inkonsistent.
Diese Arbeit leistet zwei Dinge: Erstens präsentiert sie mit formaler Stringenz den konzeptionellen Rahmen der Wohlfahrtsökonomik, die Neutralitäts-Intuition und das Anti-Neutralitäts-Argument. Zweitens macht sie diese Formalisierungen fruchtbar für eine kritische Analyse des Anti-Neutralitäts-Arguments. Drei ethische Konzeptionen werden vorausgesetzt – das Differenzprinzip, der Durchschnitts-Utilitarismus, und der Kontraktualismus – und ihre Beziehung zu den expliziten und versteckten Prämissen des Anti-Neutralitäts-Arguments wird untersucht.
Das Ergebnis ist: In keinem der drei Fälle gilt das Anti-Neutralitäts-Argument, und wir können in allen drei Fällen die Neutralitäts-Intuition akzeptieren. Ob wir das tun sollten, wird in dieser Arbeit offen gelassen. Unter der (kontroversen) Annahme, dass Ethik ein System ist, das auf den ethischen Intuitionen der Menschen basieren sollte, wäre eine empirische Untersuchung sinnvoll, wie weit die Neutralitäts-Intuition tatsächlich verbreitet ist. Wenn wir annehmen, dass die Neutralitäts-Intuition richtig ist, dann erleichtert uns das einige Berechnungen im Hinblick auf drängende Probleme wie die Erderwärmung.
How should we as a society value changes in population size? I defend the intuition of neutrality, which answers a part of the question. It states that – other things being equal – it is ethically irrelevant whether or not additional people are added to a population. The argument against neutrality criticizes the intuition of neutrality as inconsistent.
The contribution of this thesis is twofold: First, the framework of welfare economics, the intuition of neutrality, and the argument against neutrality are presented with formal rigour. Second, the formalizations are used for a critical analysis of the argument against neutrality. Three ethical frameworks are assumed – the difference principle, average utilitarianism, and contractarianism –, and their relations to the explicit and hidden premises of the argument against neutrality are investigated.
As a result, the intuition of neutrality can be assumed in these frameworks. Whether the intuition of neutrality should be adopted is left open in this thesis. Assuming that ethics is a system which should be built up from people’s ethical convictions (a controversial claim on its own), an investigation into the empirical prevalence of the intuition should be conducted. If the intuition of neutrality is considered correct, it might simplify calculations with regard to pressing problems such as global warming.
Comment devons-nous, la société, évaluer les changements de la taille de la population? Je défends l'intuition de la neutralité, qui donne une réponse partielle à cette question. Elle dit que – toutes choses étant égales par ailleurs – il n'importe pas si des gens additionels sont ajoutés à une population. L'argument contre la neutralité critique l'intuition de la neutralité pour être inconsistant.
Cette dissertation contribue deux choses: Premièrement, les conceptions de l'économique du bien-être, l'intuition de la neutralité, et l'argument contre la neutralité sont introduites en manière formelle. Deuxièmement, ces formalisations sont utilisées pour une analyse critique de l'argument contre la neutralité. Trois conceptions éthiques sont supposées – le principe de différence, le moyen-utilitarisme, et le contractualisme –, et leur relations aux prémisses explicites et implicites de l'argument contre la neutralité sont examinées.
Du coup, l'intuition de la neutralité peut être acceptée avec ces conceptions. En supposant que l'éthique est un système qui doit être construit sur la base des avies des gens (une réclamation polémique), des investigations empiriques entre la prévalence de l'intuition doivent être conduites. Si l'intuition de la neutralité est regardée comme correcte, elle peut simplifier les calculs en ce qui concerne des problèmes urgents comme le réchauffement de la planète.
Quomodo aestimandae de quantitate populi mutationes? Intuitionem neutralitatis defendo, ad rei partem respondente. Intuitio dicit – ceteris paribus – homines ad populum addere neque bonum neque malum esse. Argumentum contra neutralitatem illam intuitionem reprehendit incongruam.
Haec dissertatio dupliciter collationem facit: Primum, in formas logicas transformata ostendit et salutis oeconomicae conceptionem et intuitionem neutralitatis et argumentum contra neutralitatem. Secundum, hae formulationes ad argumenti contra neutralitatem dissectionem utuntur. Tres conceptiones morales adsumpta – qui sunt differentiae principium, medii utilitatis principium, contracti moralis doctrina –, horum relatio ad argumenti contra neutralitatem praemissas explicitas atque implicitas investigatur.
In eventu, in his conceptionibus intuitionem neutralitatis adsumere possumus. An intuitio neutralitatis adsumenda, dissertatio non scit. Si (quod est controversum) moralia de hominum opinionibus statuenda, investigatio empirica per intuitionis neutralitatis praevalentiam conducere optanda est. Si intuitio sit vera, provocantes velut calefactionem globalem problemas computare simplificabit.
- Introduction
- Exposition
- Welfare Economics
- The intuition of neutrality
- The argument against neutrality
- Critical analysis
- Aggregation and justice
- The neutral range
- Relativism
- Conclusion
Many thanks to my supervisor and first reviewer Stefan Fischer, my second reviewer Jacob Rosenthal, and to Ilija Funk for very helpful comments!
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
- For comments, please create an issue for discussing them; I will then keep the issue open and link it here.
- If you have referred to this thesis in your own work, I am happy link to your work here, as a kind of forward-reference.
- If you find some errors, please create an issue or a pull request.
- Thank you very much in advance for your contributions and suggestions! :)
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Relevant literature published after this thesis was written.
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A very clear overview over population ethics, and over its connection to climate policy as it is assumed in Broome 2004, Broome 2012, and in this thesis; a generalization of various welfare functions; an argument that policy decisions on climate change might not depend on population ethics because the relevant welfare functions might agree in the corner case. The argument is probably independent from the argument in this thesis, but one main conclusion can be derived from both arguments: The worry based on the argument against neutrality is unfounded.
Mark Budolfson, Gustaf Arrhenius and Dean Spears. Forthcoming. Does Climate Change Policy Depend Importantly on Population Ethics? Deflationary Responses to the Challenges of Population Ethics for Public Policy. Climate Change and Philosophy. [PhilPapers]