Adaptive Merkle Signature Architecture (AMSA)

This repository provides the code for the hash-based signature (HBS) described in the paper:

E. Regnath, S. Steinhorst: “AMSA: Adaptive Merkle Signature Architecture”, 2020

Getting Started

Compile binary with gcc using the Makefile

git clone git@github.com:tum-esi/AMSA.git
cd AMSA
make

Run a test by calling bin/test_amsa

Expected output:

.:: Testing AMSA
=====================================================
Signing the average hash 0x8888888.... 
 => gen:    HASH_PROFILE: Calls: 1115135,  Processed: 37846976 B
 => sign:   HASH_PROFILE: Calls: 1695,  Processed: 56320 B
 => verify: HASH_PROFILE: Calls: 521,  Processed: 19072 B

AMSA: sizes: pk=50 B, sk=48 B, sig=(2112+320)= 2432 B, aux=5703 B
 +TREE=(n=32B, h=10)
 +WOTS=(n=32B, l1=64, w1=16, l2=2, w2=31)

Further tests include test_merkle, test_wots, test_hash.

Use as a library

#include "amss.h"

// allocate data structures
AMSA_Config cfg  = AMSA_SHA256_H10;        // select config
AMSA_Amss   amss = AMSA_Amss_init( cfg );  // alloc amsa
byte_t seed[CFG_AMSA_SEED_SIZE] = { 'x' }; // seed (replace!)
AMSA_Pubkey pubkey;                        // public key
AMSA_Sig    sig  = AMSA_Sig_init( cfg );   // init signature

// generate
AMSA_generate( &amss, seed, &pubkey );

// sign
AMSA_sign( &amss, msg_digest, sig );

// verify
bool succ = AMSA_verify( &pubkey, msg_digest, sig );

Configuration is done by editing config.h.

Implementation

Security

This is not a secure implementation! This implementation is only intended to explore several time/memory trade-offs. Security issues include

the private key is stored in plaintext in the RAM
the seed needs to come from a real random source
implementation might not be resistant to side-channel attacks

Performance

LOG_x and PROFILER_x will not be compiled when they are disabled in config.h
Optimization parameters for the compiler are specified in the Makefile

Future Work

key management on filesystem with import/export
determine best height of subtrees according to available memory
proper encoding of typecode (AMSA_Config)

Related Work

Two related hash-based signature schemes are XMSS and LMS.

A. Huelsing, D. Butin, S. Gazdag, J. Rijneveld, and A. Mohaisen: “XMSS: eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme”, IRTF, RFC 8391, 2018
D. McGrew, M. Curcio, and S. Fluhrer, “Leighton-Micali Hash-Based Signatures”, IRTF, RFC 8554, 4 2019.

tum-esi / AMSA