This repo is for review of requests for signing shim. To create a request for review:
- clone this repo
- edit the template below
- add the shim.efi to be signed
- add build logs
- add any additional binaries/certificates/SHA256 hashes that may be needed
- commit all of that
- tag it with a tag of the form "myorg-shim-arch-YYYYMMDD"
- push that to github
- file an issue at https://github.com/rhboot/shim-review/issues with a link to your tag
- approval is ready when the "accepted" label is added to your issue
Note that we really only have experience with using GRUB2 on Linux, so asking us to endorse anything else for signing is going to require some convincing on your part.
Here's the template:
Viasat UK Ltd. is a subsidiary of global communications company Viasat Inc. (NASDAQ: VSAT). https://www.viasat.com/defense/
Viasat Data-At-Rest Cryptography Solid State Drive (DARC-SSD).
What's the justification that this really does need to be signed for the whole world to be able to boot it?
Viasat provides secure data protection for government and defence agencies around the world. We have used a Microsoft Secure Boot signed shim since 2016.
- Name: SecAlert, Viasat
- Position: Responsible Disclosure
- Email address: secalert@viasat.uk.com
- PGP key fingerprint: 1284 0089 74E2 7365 8177 2E28 5C6D 02C9 2AFB 4B25
- See SecAlert_Viasat.asc
- Available on PGP Global Directory.
(Key should be signed by the other security contacts, pushed to a keyserver like keyserver.ubuntu.com, and preferably have signatures that are reasonably well known in the Linux community.)
Our PGP keys have been published to the PGP Global Directory at https://keyserver.pgp.com/ and can be found with an advanced search for "Email Address contains viasat.uk.com".
- Name: Customer Support, Viasat
- Position: General Support
- Email address: support@viasat.uk.com
- PGP key fingerprint: 3FCF 9C5E C75E 930D EE90 525A 8BD1 A937 2266 D44A
- See Customer_Support_Viasat.asc
- Available on PGP Global Directory.
(Key should be signed by the other security contacts, pushed to a keyserver like keyserver.ubuntu.com, and preferably have signatures that are reasonably well known in the Linux community.)
Our PGP keys have been published to the PGP Global Directory at https://keyserver.pgp.com/ and can be found with an advanced search for "Email Address contains viasat.uk.com".
Please create your shim binaries starting with the 15.6 shim release tar file: https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/download/15.6/shim-15.6.tar.bz2
This matches https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/tag/15.6 and contains the appropriate gnu-efi source.
Yes, see CMakeLists.txt, GIT_TAG "15.6".
https://github.com/viasat/shim-review
VENDOR_CERT_FILE=viasatuk.der
- PAE is signed by Viasat UK.
DEFAULT_LOADER=\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\paex64.efi
- Shim shall load PAE only.
If shim is loading GRUB2 bootloader what exact implementation of Secureboot in GRUB2 do you have? (Either Upstream GRUB2 shim_lock verifier or Downstream RHEL/Fedora/Debian/Canonical-like implementation)
No GRUB2 bootloader.
If shim is loading GRUB2 bootloader and your previously released shim booted a version of grub affected by any of the CVEs in the July 2020 grub2 CVE list, the March 2021 grub2 CVE list, or the June 7th 2022 grub2 CVE list:
-
CVE-2020-14372
-
CVE-2020-25632
-
CVE-2020-25647
-
CVE-2020-27749
-
CVE-2020-27779
-
CVE-2021-20225
-
CVE-2021-20233
-
CVE-2020-10713
-
CVE-2020-14308
-
CVE-2020-14309
-
CVE-2020-14310
-
CVE-2020-14311
-
CVE-2020-15705
-
CVE-2021-3418 (if you are shipping the shim_lock module)
-
CVE-2021-3695
-
CVE-2021-3696
-
CVE-2021-3697
-
CVE-2022-28733
-
CVE-2022-28734
-
CVE-2022-28735
-
CVE-2022-28736
-
CVE-2022-28737
No GRUB2 bootloader.
Is upstream commit 1957a85b0032a81e6482ca4aab883643b8dae06e "efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down" applied?
Is upstream commit 75b0cea7bf307f362057cc778efe89af4c615354 "ACPI: configfs: Disallow loading ACPI tables when locked down" applied?
Is upstream commit eadb2f47a3ced5c64b23b90fd2a3463f63726066 "lockdown: also lock down previous kgdb use" applied?
No Linux kernel.
If you use vendor_db functionality of providing multiple certificates and/or hashes please briefly describe your certificate setup.
If there are allow-listed hashes please provide exact binaries for which hashes are created via file sharing service, available in public with anonymous access for verification.
Our embedded certificate is used to verify the PAE binary.
If you are re-using a previously used (CA) certificate, you will need to add the hashes of the previous GRUB2 binaries exposed to the CVEs to vendor_dbx in shim in order to prevent GRUB2 from being able to chainload those older GRUB2 binaries. If you are changing to a new (CA) certificate, this does not apply.
New certificate.
What OS and toolchain must we use to reproduce this build? Include where to find it, etc. We're going to try to reproduce your build as closely as possible to verify that it's really a build of the source tree you tell us it is, so these need to be fairly thorough. At the very least include the specific versions of gcc, binutils, and gnu-efi which were used, and where to find those binaries.
If the shim binaries can't be reproduced using the provided Dockerfile, please explain why that's the case and what the differences would be.
See Dockerfile:
docker build --no-cache .
Versions:
- gcc: 10.2.1-6
- binutils: 2.35.2-2
- dos2unix: 7.4.1-1
- gnu-efi: 3.0.12
- bsdmainutils: 12.1.7
- pesign: 0.112-6
- cmake: 3.20.5
This should include logs for creating the buildroots, applying patches, doing the build, creating the archives, etc.
- logs/viasat-docker-build.log
- logs/viasat-shim-build.log
New certificate. Updated SHIM to version 15.6.
91e3ec61205e62cd3d26c67b1b4b1f78b0c74edfeaa11e5470a3368bc0b0c71b
The private key is stored on a hardware token with restricted access.
Yes.
Do you add a vendor-specific SBAT entry to the SBAT section in each binary that supports SBAT metadata ( grub2, fwupd, fwupdate, shim + all child shim binaries )?
Please provide exact SBAT entries for all SBAT binaries you are booting or planning to boot directly through shim.
Where your code is only slightly modified from an upstream vendor's, please also preserve their SBAT entries to simplify revocation.
SHIM:
sbat,1,SBAT Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md
shim,2,UEFI shim,shim,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim
shim.viasat,1,Viasat UK,shim,15.6,mailto:secalert@viasat.uk.com
PAE:
sbat,1,SBAT Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md
viasat.pae,1,Viasat UK,pae,2.0.0,mailto:secalert@viasat.uk.com
No GRUB2 bootloader.
No GRUB2 bootloader.
The SHIM launches our Pre-Authentication Environment (PAE) application which allows an authenticated user to administer and boot Viasat DARC-SSDs. It does not allow the loading and execution of further code.
If your GRUB2 launches any other binaries that are not the Linux kernel in SecureBoot mode, please provide further details on what is launched and how it enforces Secureboot lockdown.
No GRUB2 bootloader.
The integrity of the PAE is verified with a digital signature by the SHIM.
No.
No Linux kernel.
Notable comments from previous submission:
- The
_redhatand_viasatversions are built and compared to each other because we followed the example Dockerfile. - The build product
_viasat/INSTALL/shimx64.efiis exported from the Docker image and tagged as an artifact in our VCS asBOOTX64.EFI. The build is then ran again to compare the build product against the artifactdata/BOOTX64.EFIto ensure the integrity of the product. shimx64.efiis presented at the repository root by convention for Red Hat. Our build system starts atdev/with theDockerfile.