UKano: UnlinKability and ANOnymity verifier v0.6
- Landing page: http://projects.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/ukano
- Manual: https://github.com/LCBH/UKano/wiki
UKano is a modified version of the ProVerif tool including automatic verification of anonymity and unlinkability of 2-agents protocols. See the UKano webpage for more details about the tools and references HBD19 & HBD16 given below for more details on the underlying theory.
Install
You need OCaml >=3.00 (you can find Objective Caml at http://ocaml.org).
Just type: make.
The executable program ukano and proverif have been built.
You can also build UKano only by typing make ukano.
UKano needs an exectuable of ProVerif though. Refer to the manual
for the required version.
Quick Test
To quickly test the tool on our case studies: build it, choose an example
in the examples folder (e.g., ./examples/Feldhofer/feldhofer.pi)
and type ./ukano <path-example>.
To test the tool against examples with known expected conclusions, you can also type make test.
Basic Usage
To run UKano on a protocol written in filename (compliant with ProVerif typed format), use
./ukano <filename>The tool describes the main steps it follows and concludes whether unlinkability
and anonymity could be established or not. Type ./ukano --help to see the list
of options of UKano.
How Does It Work?
We have proved in HBD19 (preliminary versions in HBD16,H17) that, for 2-party protocols, unlinkability and anonmyity follow from two sufficent conditions we called Frame Opacity (FO) and Well-Authentication (WA). We also show how to verify those two conditions relying on dedicated encodings. UKAno mechanizes all those encodings.
After parsing your file, the tool creates two other files in the same
directory. Each file encodes one of our two sufficient conditions.
The one encoding FO is suffixed with _FOpa.pi. The second suffixed
with _WAuth.pi can be used to check WA. The latter contains one query
per conditional.
UKano then launches proverif on those two files and parses the results
in order to conclude whether both conditions have been established. In such
a case, the tool concludes that the input protocol ensures unlinkability and
anonymity.
The folder ./examples/ contains some ProVerif files in the expected
format (e.g., ./examples/Feldhofer/feldhofer.pi).
They can be used as a starting point to write your own protocols.
Links
A complete manual for the tool can be found at https://github.com/LCBH/UKano/wiki. It notably describes the expected format for input files of UKano. You can find a comprehensive list of case studies and benchmarks described in the corresponding section of the manual: https://github.com/LCBH/UKano/wiki#our-case-studies.
Finally, the underlying theory behind UKano is described in HBD19 and HBD16.
References
[HBD19]: L. Hirschi, D. Baelde and S. Delaune. A method for unbounded verification of privacy-type properties. Will appear in the Journal of Computer Security. A copy can be found on ARXIV.
[H17]: L. Hirschi. PhD Thesis. Automated Verification of Privacy in Security Protocols: Back and Forth Between Theory & Practice. A copy is available at http://www.lsv.fr/~hirschi/defense.php.
[HBD16]: L. Hirschi, D. Baelde and S. Delaune. A Method for Verifying Privacy-Type Properties : The Unbounded Case. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland), 2016. A copy can be found at http://projects.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/ukano/.