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webp-sh / webp_server_go

Go version of WebP Server. A tool that will serve your JPG/PNG/BMP/SVGs as WebP/AVIF format with compression, on-the-fly.

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Directory traversal with malformed HTTP request

hans362 opened this issue · comments

commented

Describe the bug
By sending a malformed HTTP request directly to webp_server_go, attackers can read images (but not files) outside IMG_PATH defined in configuration file.

To Reproduce
Suppose webp_server_go is serving at 127.0.0.1:23333 and IMG_PATH has been set to /opt/pics. Send the following HTTP request to the server. Note that the URI part does not start with /.

GET ../../test.png HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:23333

/test.png will be returned if exists, which is outside IMG_PATH.

Expected behavior
Images outside IMG_PATH should not be accessible.

Screenshots and logs
image

2024-04-22 22:06:06 time="2024-04-22 14:06:06" level=warning msg="can't read metadata: open metadata/local/f74fd045a66c476f.json: no such file or directory" func="[38:webp_server_go/helper.ReadMetadata]"
2024-04-22 22:06:06 time="2024-04-22 14:06:06" level=info msg="Resize /test.png itself to exhaust/local/f74fd045a66c476f" func="[87:webp_server_go/encoder.ResizeItself]"
2024-04-22 22:06:06  - [2024-04-22 14:06:05] GET ../../test.png 200

Environment

  • OS: Any
  • Version: 0.11.2

Additional context
The patch for CVE-2021-46104 is not sufficient. path.Clean(reqUri) won't remove all ../ if reqUri begins with ../.

commented

Thanks a lot for reporting this, will be solved in #331

We came up two ideas for mitigating this:

  1. Deny all request path that doesn't have prefix /
  2. Check if request path is starting with . or ./ as in current PR

Do you have any suggestion on this? @hans362

commented

I would suggest the first solution, which is to deny all request path that doesn't have prefix /, since this complies with RFC 7230 Section 5.3.1.

If the target URI's path component is empty, the client MUST send "/" as the path within the origin-form of request-target.

Meanwhile, this ensures that path.Clean() removes all ../ in the request path and will never traverse out of / so that it can be safely joined with IMG_PATH.

The second solution cannot mitigate this issue, since the following payload still works.

GET a/../../../test.png HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:23333
commented

Thank you for your explanation, I've updated PR and got it merged, the fix will be available in 0.11.3 (https://github.com/webp-sh/webp_server_go/releases/tag/0.11.3)

Thank you again for helping us to point out this vulnerability, which is very helpful to us! ❤️