flatcar / Flatcar

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update: git

sayanchowdhury opened this issue · comments

Name: git
CVEs: CVE-2024-32002, CVE-2024-32004, CVE-2024-32020, CVE-2024-32021, CVE-2024-32465

CVSSs: 9.0, 8.1, 3.9, 3.9, 7.3
Action Needed: update to either v2.45.1, v2.44.1, v2.43.4

Summary:

  • CVE-2024-32002

  • (GHSA-8h77-4q3w-gfgv):

    Recursive clones on case-insensitive filesystems that support symbolic
    links are susceptible to case confusion that can be exploited to
    execute just-cloned code during the clone operation.

    This allows the attack where a recursive clone would first initialize a
    submodule, then replace its parent directory with a symbolic link into
    the .git/ directory where the second stage of the recursive clone
    would then write e.g. hooks that would be immediately executed before
    the user has had a chance to inspect what is getting executed.

    Credit for finding the vulnerability goes to Filip Hejsek, credit for
    fixing it goes to Johannes Schindelin.

  • CVE-2024-32004

  • (GHSA-xfc6-vwr8-r389):

    Repositories can be configured to execute arbitrary code during local
    clones. To address this, the ownership checks introduced in v2.30.3
    are now extended to cover cloning local repositories.

    The most obvious attack vector is to prepare a local partial clone that
    is intentionally missing objects, override in its config what
    upload-pack executable use, and then talk another user on the same
    machine to clone that. This will run that configured upload-pack
    executable under using person's permissions.

    Credit for finding the vulnerability goes to Filip Hejsek, credit for
    fixing it goes to Johannes Schindelin.

  • CVE-2024-32020

  • (GHSA-5rfh-556j-fhgj):

    Local clones may end up hardlinking files into the target repository's
    object database when source and target repository reside on the same
    disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user, then
    those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the
    untrusted user.

    This vulnerability allows a bait-and-switch attack where individual
    objects are replaced in already-indexed pack file; Git will not verify
    that the object's contents match its recorded object ID in that case.

    Credit for finding and for fixing the vulnerability goes to Patrick
    Steinhardt.

  • CVE-2024-32021

  • (GHSA-mvxm-9j2h-qjx7):

    When cloning a local source repository that contains symlinks via the
    filesystem, Git may create hardlinks to arbitrary user-readable files
    on the same filesystem as the target repository in the objects/
    directory.

    This allows the same attack vector that CVE-2022-39253 tried to
    prevent, by exploiting a time-of-check-time-of-use race.

    Credit for finding and for fixing the vulnerability goes to Patrick
    Steinhardt.

  • CVE-2024-32465

  • (GHSA-vm9j-46j9-qvq4):

    It is supposed to be safe to clone untrusted repositories, even those
    unpacked from zip archives or tarballs originating from untrusted
    sources, but Git can be tricked to run arbitrary code as part of the
    clone.

    The attack vectors are the same as for the CVEs mentioned above that
    involve local clones, but social-engineering is required to manipulate
    a user into unpacking a .zip file and running Git commands on the
    unpacked files.

    Credit for finding and for fixing the vulnerability goes to Jeff King.

refmap.gentoo: https://bugs.gentoo.org/931941

CVE-2024-32002 has a critical severity, CVSS 9.0.