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asraa / cosign

Container Signing

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cosign

Container Signing, Verification and Storage in an OCI registry.

Cosign aims to make signatures invisible infrastructure.

intro

Info

Cosign is developed as part of the sigstore project. We also use a slack slack channel! Click here for the invite link.

🚨 🚨 🚨 See here for info on the experimental Keyless signatures mode. 🚨 🚨 🚨

Installation

If you have Go 1.16+, you can directly install by running:

$ go install github.com/sigstore/cosign/cmd/cosign@latest

and the resulting binary will be placed at $HOME/go/bin/cosign.

Containers

CI Built containers are published for every commit at gcr.io/projectsigstore/cosign/ci/cosign. They are tagged with the commit. They can be found with crane ls:

$ crane ls gcr.io/projectsigstore/cosign/ci/cosign
749f896
749f896bb378aca5cb45c5154fc0cb43f6728d48

Releases

Releases are published in this repository under the Releases page, and hosted in the GCS bucket cosign-releases. They can be viewed with gsutil:

$ gsutil ls gs://cosign-releases/v0.1.0
gs://cosign-releases/v0.1.0/cosign
gs://cosign-releases/v0.1.0/cosign.sha256
gs://cosign-releases/v0.1.0/cosign.sig

Cross platform builds will start in v0.2.0.

Quick Start

This shows how to:

  • generate a keypair
  • sign a container image and store that signature in the registry
  • find signatures for a container image, and verify them against a public key

See the Usage documentation for more commands!

See the FUN.md documentation for some fun tips and tricks!

Generate a keypair

$ cosign generate-key-pair
Enter password for private key:
Enter again:
Private key written to cosign.key
Public key written to cosign.key

Sign a container and store the signature in the registry

$ cosign sign -key cosign.key dlorenc/demo
Enter password for private key:
Pushing signature to: index.docker.io/dlorenc/demo:sha256-87ef60f558bad79beea6425a3b28989f01dd417164150ab3baab98dcbf04def8.cosign

Verify a container against a public key

This command returns 0 if at least one cosign formatted signature for the image is found matching the public key. See the detailed usage below for information and caveats on other signature formats.

Any valid payloads are printed to stdout, in json format. Note that these signed payloads include the digest of the container image, which is how we can be sure these "detached" signatures cover the correct image.

$ cosign verify -key cosign.pub dlorenc/demo
The following checks were performed on these signatures:
  - The cosign claims were validated
  - The signatures were verified against the specified public key
{"Critical":{"Identity":{"docker-reference":""},"Image":{"Docker-manifest-digest":"sha256:87ef60f558bad79beea6425a3b28989f01dd417164150ab3baab98dcbf04def8"},"Type":"cosign container signature"},"Optional":null}

Detailed Usage

See the Usage documentation for more commands!

Rekor Support

Note: this is an experimental feature

To publish signed artifacts to a Rekor transparency log and verify their existence in the log set the COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1 environment variable.

COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1 cosign sign -key cosign.key dlorenc/demo
COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1 cosign verify -key cosign.pub dlorenc/demo

cosign defaults to using the public instance of rekor at api.rekor.dev. To configure the rekor server, set the REKOR_SERVER env variable.

Caveats

Intentionally Missing Features

cosign only generates ECDSA-P256 keys and uses SHA256 hashes. Keys are stored in PEM-encoded PKCS8 format. However, you can use cosign to store and retrieve signatures in any format, from any algorithm.

cosign does not handle key-distribution or PKI.

cosign does not handle expiry or revocation. See here for some discussion on the topic.

cosign does not handle public-key management or storage. There are no keyrings or local state.

Unintentionally Missing Features

cosign will integrate with transparency logs! See sigstore#34 for more info.

cosign will integrate with even more transparency logs, and a PKI. See https://github.com/sigStore/fulcio for more info.

Registry Support

cosign uses go-containerregistry for registry interactions, which has excellent support, but other registries may have quirks.

Today, cosign has been tested and works against the following registries:

  • GCP's Artifact Registry and Container Registry
  • Docker Hub
  • Azure Container Registry
  • JFrog Artifactory Container Registry

We aim for wide registry support. Please help test! See sigstore#40 for the tracking issue.

Things That Should Probably Change

Payload Formats

cosign only supports Red Hat's simple signing format for payloads. That looks like:

{
    "critical": {
           "identity": {
               "docker-reference": "testing/manifest"
           },
           "image": {
               "Docker-manifest-digest": "sha256:20be...fe55"
           },
           "type": "cosign container signature"
    },
    "optional": {
           "creator": "atomic",
           "timestamp": 1458239713
    }
}

Note: This can be generated for an image reference using cosign generate <image>.

I'm happy to switch this format to something else if it makes sense. See [notaryproject/notation#40] for one option.

Registry Details

cosign signatures are stored as separate objects in the OCI registry, with only a weak reference back to the object they "sign". This means this relationship is opaque to the registry, and signatures will not be deleted or garbage-collected when the image is deleted. Similarly, they can easily be copied from one environment to another, but this is not automatic.

Multiple signatures are stored in a list which is unfortunately "racy" today. To add a signtaure, clients orchestrate a "read-append-write" operation, so the last write will win in the case of contention.

Signature Specification

cosign is inspired by tools like minisign and signify.

Generated private keys are stored in PEM format. The keys encrypted under a password using scrypt as a KDF and nacl/secretbox for encryption.

They have a PEM header of ENCRYPTED COSIGN PRIVATE KEY:

-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED COSIGN PRIVATE KEY-----
...
-----END ENCRYPTED COSIGN PRIVATE KEY-----

Public keys are stored on disk in PEM-encoded standard PKIX format with a header of PUBLIC KEY.

-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
NqfC4CpZiE4OGpuYFSSMzXHJqXQ6u1W55prrZIjjZJ0=
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

The inner (base64 encoded) data portion can be supplied directly on the command line without the PEM blocks:

$ cosign verify -key NqfC4CpZiE4OGpuYFSSMzXHJqXQ6u1W55prrZIjjZJ0= us-central1-docker.pkg.dev/dlorenc-vmtest2/test/taskrun

Storage Specification

cosign stores signatures in an OCI registry, and uses a naming convention (tag based on the sha256 of what we're signing) for locating the signature index.

reg.example.com/ubuntu@sha256:703218c0465075f4425e58fac086e09e1de5c340b12976ab9eb8ad26615c3715 has signatures located at reg.example.com/ubuntu:sha256-703218c0465075f4425e58fac086e09e1de5c340b12976ab9eb8ad26615c3715

Roughly (ignoring ports in the hostname): s/:/-/g and s/@/:/g to find the signature index.

See Race conditions for some caveats around this strategy.

Alternative implementations could use transparency logs, local filesystem, a separate repository registry, an explicit reference to a signature index, a new registry API, grafeas, etc.

Signing subjects

cosign only works for artifacts stored as "manifests" in the registry today. The proposed mechanism is flexible enough to support signing arbitrary things.

KMS Support

cosign supports using a KMS provider to generate and sign keys. Right now we only support GCP KMS, but are hoping to support more in the future!

To generate a key in GCP KMS (and a key ring, if necessary) run:

cosign generate-key-pair -kms gcpkms://projects/<PROJECT ID>/locations/<LOCATION>/keyRings/<KEY_RING>/cryptoKeys/<KEY_NAME>

This command will also save the public key to a file locally, which can be used for verification later on.

To sign an image run:

cosign sign -kms gcpkms://projects/<PROJECT ID>/locations/<LOCATION>/keyRings/<KEY_RING>/cryptoKeys/<KEY_NAME> dlorenc/demo

and to verify with the public key in KMS:

cosign verify -kms gcpkms://projects/<PROJECT ID>/locations/<LOCATION>/keyRings/<KEY_RING>/cryptoKeys/<KEY_NAME> dlorenc/demo

FAQ

Who is using this?

Hopefully no one yet. Stay tuned, though.

Why not use Notary v2

Why not use containers/image signing

containers/image signing is close to cosign, and we reuse payload formats. cosign differs in that it signs with ECDSA-P256 keys instead of PGP, and stores signatures in the registry.

Why not use TUF?

I believe this tool is complementary to TUF, and they can be used together. I haven't tried yet, but think we can also reuse a registry for TUF storage.

Why not use Blockchain?

Just kidding. Nobody actually asked this. Don't be that person.

Why not use $FOO?

See the next section, Requirements. I designed this tool to meet a few specific requirements, and didn't find anything else that met all of these. If you're aware of another system that does meet these, please let me know!

Design Requirements

  • No external services for signature storage, querying, or retrieval
  • We aim for as much registry support as possible
  • Everything should work over the registry API
  • PGP should not be required at all.
  • Users must be able to find all signatures for an image
  • Signers can sign an image after push
  • Multiple entities can sign an image
  • Signing an image does not mutate the image
  • Pure-go implementation

Future Ideas

Registry API Changes

The naming convention and read-modify-write update patterns we use to store things in a registry a bit, well, "hacky". I think they're the best (only) real option available today, but if the registry API changes we can improve these.

Other Types

cosign can sign anything in a registry. These examples show signing a single image, but you could also sign a multi-platform Index, or any other type of artifact. This includes Helm Charts, Tekton Pipelines, and anything else currently using OCI registries for distribution.

This also means new artifact types can be uploaded to a registry and signed. One interesting type to store and sign would be TUF repositories. I haven't tried yet, but I'm fairly certain TUF could be implemented on top of this.

Tag Signing

cosign signatures protect the digests of objects stored in a registry. The optional annotations support (via the -a flag to cosign sign) can be used to add extra data to the payload that is signed and protected by the signature. One use-case for this might be to sign a tag->digest mapping.

If you would like to attest that a specific tag (or set of tags) should point at a digest, you can run something like:

$ TAG=sign-me
$ DGST=$(crane digest dlorenc/demo:$TAG)
$ cosign sign -key cosign.key -a tag=$TAG dlorenc/demo@$DGST
Enter password for private key:
Pushing signature to: dlorenc/demo:sha256-97fc222cee7991b5b061d4d4afdb5f3428fcb0c9054e1690313786befa1e4e36.cosign

Then you can verify that the tag->digest mapping is also covered in the signature, using the -a flag to cosign verify. This example verifes that the digest $TAG points to (sha256:97fc222cee7991b5b061d4d4afdb5f3428fcb0c9054e1690313786befa1e4e36) has been signed, and also that the $TAG:

$ cosign verify -key cosign.pub -a tag=$TAG dlorenc/demo:$TAG | jq .
{
  "Critical": {
    "Identity": {
      "docker-reference": ""
    },
    "Image": {
      "Docker-manifest-digest": "97fc222cee7991b5b061d4d4afdb5f3428fcb0c9054e1690313786befa1e4e36"
    },
    "Type": "cosign container signature"
  },
  "Optional": {
    "tag": "sign-me"
  }
}

Timestamps could also be added here, to implement TUF-style freeze-attack prevention.

Base Image/Layer Signing

Again, cosign can sign anything in a registry. You could use cosign to sign an image that is intended to be used as a base image, and inlcude that provenance metadata in resulting derived images. This could be used to enforce that an image was built from an authorized base image.

Rough Idea:

  • OCI manifests have an ordered list of layer Descriptors, which can contain annotations. See here for the specification.
  • A base image is an ordered list of layers to which other layers are appended, as well as an initial configuration object that is mutated.
    • A derived image is free to completely delete/destroy/recreate the config from its base image, so signing the config would provided limited value.
  • We can sign the full set of ordered base layers, and attach that signature as an annotation to the last layer in the resulting child image.

This example manifest manifest represents an image that has been built from a base image with two layers. One additional layer is added, forming the final image.

{
  "schemaVersion": 2,
  "config": {
    "mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.image.config.v1+json",
    "size": 7023,
    "digest": "sha256:b5b2b2c507a0944348e0303114d8d93aaaa081732b86451d9bce1f432a537bc7"
  },
  "layers": [
    {
      "mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.image.layer.v1.tar+gzip",
      "size": 32654,
      "digest": "sha256:9834876dcfb05cb167a5c24953eba58c4ac89b1adf57f28f2f9d09af107ee8f0"
    },
    {
      "mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.image.layer.v1.tar+gzip",
      "size": 16724,
      "digest": "sha256:3c3a4604a545cdc127456d94e421cd355bca5b528f4a9c1905b15da2eb4a4c6b",
      "annotations": {
        "dev.cosign.signature.baseimage": "Ejy6ipGJjUzMDoQFePWixqPBYF0iSnIvpMWps3mlcYNSEcRRZelL7GzimKXaMjxfhy5bshNGvDT5QoUJ0tqUAg=="
      }
    },
    {
      "mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.image.layer.v1.tar+gzip",
      "size": 73109,
      "digest": "sha256:ec4b8955958665577945c89419d1af06b5f7636b4ac3da7f12184802ad867736"
    }
  ],
}

Note that this could be applied recursively, for multiple intermediate base images.

Counter-Signing

Cosign signatures (and their protected paylaods) are stored as artifacts in a registry. These signature objects can also be signed, resulting in a new, "counter-signature" artifact. This "counter-signature" protects the signature (or set of signatures) and the referenced artifact, which allows it to act as an attestation to the signature(s) themselves.

Before we sign the signature artifact, we first give it a memorable name so we can find it later.

$ cosign sign -key cosign.key -a sig=original dlorenc/demo
Enter password for private key:
Pushing signature to: dlorenc/demo:sha256-97fc222cee7991b5b061d4d4afdb5f3428fcb0c9054e1690313786befa1e4e36.cosign
$ cosign verify -key cosign.pub dlorenc/demo | jq .
{
  "Critical": {
    "Identity": {
      "docker-reference": ""
    },
    "Image": {
      "Docker-manifest-digest": "97fc222cee7991b5b061d4d4afdb5f3428fcb0c9054e1690313786befa1e4e36"
    },
    "Type": "cosign container signature"
  },
  "Optional": {
    "sig": "original"
  }
}

# Now give that signature a memorable name, then sign that
$ crane tag $(cosign triangulate dlorenc/demo) mysignature
2021/02/15 20:22:55 dlorenc/demo:mysignature: digest: sha256:71f70e5d29bde87f988740665257c35b1c6f52dafa20fab4ba16b3b1f4c6ba0e size: 556
$ cosign sign -key cosign.key -a sig=counter dlorenc/demo:mysignature
Enter password for private key:
Pushing signature to: dlorenc/demo:sha256-71f70e5d29bde87f988740665257c35b1c6f52dafa20fab4ba16b3b1f4c6ba0e.cosign
$ cosign verify -key cosign.pub dlorenc/demo:mysignature
{"Critical":{"Identity":{"docker-reference":""},"Image":{"Docker-manifest-digest":"71f70e5d29bde87f988740665257c35b1c6f52dafa20fab4ba16b3b1f4c6ba0e"},"Type":"cosign container signature"},"Optional":{"sig":"counter"}}

# Finally, check the original signature
$ crane manifest dlorenc/demo@sha256:71f70e5d29bde87f988740665257c35b1c6f52dafa20fab4ba16b3b1f4c6ba0e
{
  "schemaVersion": 2,
  "mediaType": "application/vnd.docker.distribution.manifest.v2+json",
  "config": {
    "mediaType": "application/vnd.docker.container.image.v1+json",
    "size": 233,
    "digest": "sha256:3b25a088710d03f39be26629d22eb68cd277a01673b9cb461c4c24fbf8c81c89"
  },
  "layers": [
    {
      "mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.descriptor.v1+json",
      "size": 217,
      "digest": "sha256:0e79a356609f038089088ec46fd95f4649d04de989487220b1a0adbcc63fadae",
      "annotations": {
        "dev.sigstore.cosign/signature": "5uNZKEP9rm8zxAL0VVX7McMmyArzLqtxMTNPjPO2ns+5GJpBeXg+i9ILU+WjmGAKBCqiexTxzLC1/nkOzD4cDA=="
      }
    }
  ]
}

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Container Signing

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